



Oxford Cambridge and RSA

Wednesday 24 May 2023 – Morning

A Level History A

Y315/01 The Changing Nature of Warfare 1792–1945

Time allowed: 2 hours 30 minutes



You must have:

- the OCR 12–page Answer Booklet

INSTRUCTIONS

- Use black ink.
- Write your answer to each question in the Answer Booklet. The question numbers must be clearly shown.
- Fill in the boxes on the front of the Answer Booklet.
- Answer the question in Section A and **any two** questions in Section B.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is **80**.
- The marks for each question are shown in brackets [].
- Quality of extended response will be assessed in questions marked with an asterisk (*).
- This document has **4** pages.

ADVICE

- Read each question carefully before you start your answer.

SECTION A

Read the **two** passages and answer Question 1.

- 1 Evaluate the interpretations in **both** of the two passages and explain which you think is more convincing as an explanation of the success of French armies during the Revolutionary Wars of 1792–1802. [30]

Passage A

A great leap forward in military thinking was implemented with the French Revolution. It resulted in a French military force equipped with revolutionary new tactics designed to destroy the traditional armies of Europe. General Doumouriez practised a mixture of the tactics of the *ordre mince* (a thin line) and the *ordre profond* (deep line or column). By this he had considerable success. Others were more radical still, ordering their men into battle in columns made up of conscripts of a new mass army.

France's use of massed artillery bombardment was also an innovation. Moreau used a mixture of old and new tactics long in advance of Napoleon who adopted these tactics in Italy and Egypt. Independent infantry squares were devastating in Egypt against Mameluke cavalry charges. In Napoleon's Italian campaign he had pioneered the idea of marching with two or three independent smaller armies to liaise at a single weak point in the enemy line, providing a concentration of force where the enemy least expected it to gain decisive victory.

The French military learned from Moreau, Jourdan and Napoleon to deploy different divisions independently; to coordinate infantry, cavalry and artillery and to concentrate overwhelming force at the enemy's weakest point. The British had no prospect of defeating this apparently unstoppable military power.

Adapted from: Robert Harvey, *The War of Wars: The Epic Struggle Between Britain and France 1789–1815*, published in 2006.

Passage B

The explanation of French success in defending the Revolution, especially in the campaigns of 1793 and 1794, is often made in terms of a new warfare. The political leadership exercised a brutal but effective policy of maintaining controls over the generals. Seventeen were executed in 1793 and 67 in 1794. There was a considerable growth in the size of the armies raised by the new French republic and its minister for war, Carnot, the so-called 'architect of victory'. Revolutionary leaders were able to control and militarise the population far more than the French kings of the old regime.

It could be that the key changes in warfare and to French victories was the result of larger and inexperienced forces being prepared to take casualties and having morale and determination to fight unstintingly for a cause, backed by dictatorial regimes using their power to ensure that they were reinforced and supplied. Others have suggested that Carnot, as minister of war, brought a new element of sheer ferocity and supported it by his organisational changes. If men could be conscripted, so also could the resources of the nation to arm, equip, clothe and feed them. A planned war economy was based on fear of the guillotine. This involved the requisitioning of crops, the creation of a national loaf and rationing. Arms, uniforms and equipment were produced on a national scale. Success was based on a transition from an age of limited warfare based on dynastic concerns to an age of total and national struggle.

Adapted from: N. Fellows and M. Wells, *The Changing Nature of Warfare 1792–1945*, published in 2016.

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SECTION B

Answer any **two** questions.

- 2*** 'The work of military theorists had little impact on the conduct of war in the period from 1792 to 1945.' How far do you agree? **[25]**
- 3*** 'Military plans were more important in determining the outcome of wars in the period from 1866 to 1945 than in the period from 1792 to 1865.' How far do you agree? **[25]**
- 4*** 'Public opinion had a greater impact on the First World War than any other war in the period from 1792 to 1945.' How far do you agree? **[25]**

END OF QUESTION PAPER

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