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HISTORY**9489/42**

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MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 60

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Generic Marking Principles

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:

Rules must be applied consistently, e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

AO2 – Demonstrate an understanding of the past through explanation, analysis and a substantiated judgement of key concepts: causation, consequence, continuity, change and significance within an historical context, the relationships between key features and characteristics of the periods studied.		
<i>This mark scheme assesses the quality of analysis demonstrated in addressing the question.</i>		
Level 5	<p>Answers demonstrate a full understanding of the question, are balanced and analytical.</p> <p>Answers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish valid and wide-ranging criteria for assessing the question. • Are consistently analytical of the key features and characteristics of the period. • Provide a focused, balanced argument with a sustained line of reasoning throughout. • Reach a clear and sustained judgement. 	13–15
Level 4	<p>Answers demonstrate a good understanding of the question, and are mostly analytical.</p> <p>Answers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish valid criteria for assessing the question. • Are analytical of the key features and characteristics of the period, but treatment of points may be uneven. • Attempt to provide a balanced argument but may lack coherence and precision in some places. • Reach a supported judgement, although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated. 	10–12
Level 3	<p>Answers demonstrate an understanding of the question and contain some analysis. Argument lacks balance.</p> <p>Answers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Show attempts at establishing criteria for assessing the question. • Show some analysis of the key features and characteristics of the period but may also contain descriptive passages. • Provide an argument but lacks balance, coherence and precision. • Begin to form a judgement although with weak substantiation. 	7–9
Level 2	<p>Answers demonstrate some understanding of the question and are descriptive.</p> <p>Answers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attempt to establish criteria for assessing the question but these may be implicit. • Show limited analysis of the key features and characteristics of the period and contain descriptive passages that are not always clearly related to the focus of the question. • Make an attempt at proving an argument, but this is done inconsistently and/or may be unrelated to the focus of the question. • Make an assertion rather than a judgement. 	4–6

AO2 – Demonstrate an understanding of the past through explanation, analysis and a substantiated judgement of key concepts: causation, consequence, continuity, change and significance within an historical context, the relationships between key features and characteristics of the periods studied.

This mark scheme assesses the quality of analysis demonstrated in addressing the question.

Level 1	<p>Answers address the topic, but not the question.</p> <p>Answers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on the topic rather than the question. • Lack analysis or an argument. • Lack a relevant judgement. 	1–3
Level 0	No creditable content.	0

AO1 – Recall, select and deploy historical knowledge appropriately and effectively.		
<i>This mark scheme assesses the quality and depth of knowledge deployed to support the argument made.</i>		
Level 5	<p>Answers demonstrate a high level of relevant detail.</p> <p>Supporting material:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is carefully selected. • Is fully focused on supporting the argument. • Is wide-ranging. • Is consistently precise and accurate. 	13–15
Level 4	<p>Answers demonstrate a good level of relevant supporting detail.</p> <p>Supporting material:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is selected appropriately. • Is mostly focused on supporting the argument. • Covers a range of points but the depth may be uneven. • Is mostly precise and accurate. 	10–12
Level 3	<p>Answers demonstrate an adequate level of supporting detail.</p> <p>Supporting material:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is mostly appropriately selected. • May not fully support the points being made, may be descriptive in places. • Covers a narrow range of points. • Occasionally lacks precision and accuracy in places. 	7–9
Level 2	<p>Answers demonstrate some relevant supporting detail.</p> <p>Supporting material:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is presented as a narrative. • Is not directly linked to the argument. • Is limited in range and depth. • Frequently lacks precision and accuracy. 	4–6
Level 1	<p>Answers demonstrate limited knowledge of the topic.</p> <p>Supporting material:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has limited relevance to the argument. • Is inaccurate or vague. 	1–3
Level 0	No creditable content.	0

Question	Answer	Marks
1	<p>'Mussolini's agricultural policy was his greatest economic success' Discuss this view.</p> <p>This question requires candidates to examine and assess the various economic policies and judge the success and failure of Mussolini's agricultural policy and which policy was the most successful. Agriculture was in crisis from 1925–1935 and the fascist regime focused on it. The Battle for Grain was announced in 1925 and aimed at self-sufficiency. Wheat production increased 50% and large farms in the North did well by benefiting from mechanisation and fertilisers, but olives, fruit and vegetables were neglected, and animal farming was neglected as fodder was expensive. Meat and egg production fell, and prices increased and living standards declined. Italy was still dependent on imports. The Battle for Land aimed at land reclamation to increase agricultural land and provide jobs. New Towns were built on reclaimed land and the Pontine Marshes were drained. However, the plan failed to meet the targets, only 58% of reclamation projects were completed, few people resettled, and small farmers benefited least. The Battle for The Lira was started as the value of the lira was falling against other currencies, and in 1927, Mussolini pegged the lira at a higher level that big business wanted. Exports decreased because they became difficult, and unemployment rose. It did benefit steel, chemicals, and armaments because imports were cheaper, but overall Mussolini was a failed policy. Industry saw economic growth, for example, Alfa Romeo, the oil industry at Bari and Livorno, and the Ansaldo steelmaking and shipbuilding firm. Another economic policy was the development of transport, for example, the autostrada, which improved travel links and provided employment. Electrification of the railways with over 5000 km electrified linking Milan, Rome, Naples, Austria, and Switzerland. In the South, transport was still inadequate. Fiscally, Italy imposed tariffs to protect against foreign trade, and imposed The Decree Law of 1927 which allowed the state to deduct from workers' pay to contribute towards social benefits. Taxes remained low, but these deductions squeezed workers' pay and negatively affected living standards. The Corporate State as a concept and in practice could also be looked at.</p> <p>Having examined a variety of policies, it is important that candidates evaluate them and reach a reasoned verdict on success and failure and the stated policy of agriculture in relation to other policies.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p>Assess the reasons for the introduction of Stalin’s first five-year plan in 1928.</p> <p>This question requires a careful examination and analysis of the causes and then an evaluation of them. Causes might include the failure of the New Economic Policy by 1927, the need to remove his final rival in the power struggle, Bukharin, the need to assert his control over the Communist Party and dictate policy, the aim to achieve ‘Socialism in One Country’ and the ideological desire to turn the Soviet Union more towards communism than the mixed economy of the New Economic Policy had allowed. Fear of invasion also played a part in the change of direction. Prior to 1928, the Soviet Union had followed a policy of War Communism to win the Civil War and then took a step backwards and adopted the New Economic Policy, which allowed a mixed economy and was a temporary measure. However, by 1927 the New Economic Policy was failing, and Stalin had eliminated all leadership rivals apart from Bukharin. There were political and economic motives for the change of economic policy. The first five-year plan was to build ‘socialism in one country’. This meant building up the industrial base of the country and its military might and in addition move towards real socialism and away from the mixed economy. The first five-year plan introduced Collectivisation to make sure that agriculture supported industry and any peasant resistance was overcome. This policy was largely disastrous. On the Industrial side there was a focus on heavy industry, including iron, steel, and coal to build up the economic strength of the country. The first five-year plan also allowed class war to be unleashed, the liquidation of the Kulaks to begin and the removal of the NEPMEN.</p> <p>This essay needs to examine the political, economic, and ideological motives for the introduction of the first five-year plan and to assess and evaluate them in a logical and sustained manner.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p>Assess the extent to which Hitler's economic priority was rearmament in the period 1933–39.</p> <p>Hitler's economic policies had various strands and motivations. Amongst these might be included rearmament, Autarky, solving unemployment, buttressing his popularity, building the infrastructure of Germany, and ensuring that the economy served his ends as well as providing for agriculture. Reducing unemployment was a key aim and promise. This was achieved by the Reich Labour Service, compulsory military service from 1935, removing women from the workforce and offering families loans provided the wife stayed at home. Public Work Schemes such as civic reconstruction and autobahn construction in conjunction with a massive expansion in the car industry and a shortened working week so that more people needed to work also helped. Unemployment was virtually eliminated by 1938. Schacht's New Plan aimed at a recovery through trade and how far that was seen as an essential prerequisite for funding rearmament before the more obviously rearmament-based Four Year Plan could be discussed. Economically the Nazis tried to support the Middle Class, forbidding large department stores from opening new branches, but also government needed Big Business to support rearmament. Agriculture seen as very important and followed a 'blood and soil' policy. Reich Food Estate set up under Darré, production increased 25% by 1939 and Germany was 83% self-sufficient in food. The Reich Entailed Farm Law prevented smaller farms being broken up and was unpopular with farmers because it prevented the creation of more efficient larger farms. Small farmers and the Middle Class did not benefit as expected. The large department stores were never closed, and Big Business and Reich Food Estate did not reduce its influence which annoyed farmers because this limited what they could charge for their crops. Rearmament was a key policy with Mefo Bills to fund. In 1936, Goring put forward a Four-Year Plan to prepare for war and develop synthetics, and by 1938, gained Austrian industry and later Czech industry too, including conscription, building up the army, air force and navy. Rearmament was a key policy, as it underpinned Hitler's foreign policy aims, but he also wanted to solve unemployment. He wanted both 'guns and butter'.</p> <p>Answers must address the various strands of the Nazi economic policy and reach a sustained judgement on the stated factor of rearmament.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
4	<p>'British public opinion towards war was dominated by pacifism in the period 1934–39'. Assess this view.</p> <p>This question requires examination of public opinion, including how far pacifism has such dominated it and how far public opinion changed in the light of international events. At the beginning of the 1930s, public opinion had been strongly opposed to war and rearmament, although this began to shift by mid-decade. In 1935, 11 million responded to the League of Nations 'Peace Ballot' by pledging support for the reduction of armaments by international agreement. On the other hand, the same survey also found that 58.7% of British voters favoured 'collective military sanctions' against aggressors, and public reaction to the Hoare-Laval Pact with Mussolini was extremely unfavourable. Even the left-wing of the pacifist movement quickly began to turn, with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and many peace-balloters began signing up for the international brigades to fight Franco. By the height of the Spanish conflict in 1937, most young pacifists had modified their views to accept that war could be a legitimate response to aggression and fascism. Czechoslovakia did not concern most people until the middle of September 1938, when they began to object to a small democratic state being bullied. Nevertheless, the initial response of the British public to the Munich agreement was generally favourable. As Chamberlain left for Munich in 1938, the whole House of Commons cheered him on. On 30th September 1938, as he returned to Britain from Munich, the Munich agreement was supported by most of the press. Positive opinion of appeasement was shaped partly by media manipulation. After Munich, there was a reaction against appeasement. The results of an October 1938 Gallup poll showed 86% of the public believing that Hitler was lying about his future territorial ambitions. Around 15 000 people protested to the prime minister in Trafalgar Square and 10 000 more welcomed him at 10 Downing Street. The pacifism could be contrasted with public concerns to avoid war where it was unclear that British interests were at stake, and a distinction could be drawn between the mood of the early-1930s and the late-1930s due to the impact of the Spanish Civil War and moral concerns over Munich and Hitler's actions in taking Bohemia and Moravia.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
5	<p data-bbox="316 248 1283 315">Evaluate the effectiveness of the economic policies of the US federal government in the late-1940s and 1950s.</p> <p data-bbox="316 349 1315 853">The economic growth of the late 1940s and 1950s was remarkable, with family income rising by over 30% and low unemployment rates, developments in infrastructure including technology, and urban growth. The key elements of Eisenhower's policy included a balanced budget and a maintained balance between the freedom of private enterprise and state intervention to improve infrastructure, such as the interstate highway system. Defence spending provided an economic stimulus. The growth of free trade with the GATT talks and the subsequent tariff reductions promoted exports. However, the prosperity also heavily depended on factors outside the government's control with the maintenance of cheap oil, the growth of technology in the electronics and automobile industries, the innovation of the private sector, and the sustained capital investment of the period. This could be linked to the encouragement of business confidence by federal policies, which were business friendly and aimed at maintaining foreign and domestic stability.</p> <p data-bbox="316 891 1305 1122">One of the biggest economic surges came in 1950, but was not directly the result of Truman's economic policies. Truman had maintained high levels of government spending, such as the GI Bill, and did little to cut taxes to stimulate demand or encourage industry. However, a sudden burst of consumer spending perhaps triggered by fears and uncertainty of the situation in Korea and a upsurge in the housing market led to the so called 'Truman boom'.</p> <p data-bbox="316 1160 1310 1491">A feature of government policy during this period was high levels of taxation, subsidies, and spending, particularly on the 'military industrial complex'. Conservatives argue that this restricted enterprise, but an alternative argument is that it maintained social stability and consumer and investor confidence. There were modest growth rates of 2.4% on average after 1952 (lower than the 4% of the later 1940s), but unemployment remained low as did inflation. The national debt fell, which gave confidence in sound finance despite Eisenhower rejecting tax cuts. The planned increase in welfare provision was sacrificed for spending in heavy defence so the increase in purchasing power was less widespread than it might have been.</p> <p data-bbox="316 1529 1310 1727">Critics on the left might point to inequalities of wealth and lack of investment in the economy as opposed to military technology and roads. Critics on the right might point to a failure to dismantle the high levels of regulation, government control and the failure to stimulate the private sector with tax cuts. However, there were only three period of recession between 1947–1963 and there were some key indicators of economic success.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
6	<p>Assess the reasons for the rise of the ‘imperial presidency’ in the 1960s and 1970s.</p> <p>Factors might include personalities, ambitions and increasing pressure from foreign policy. The idea that an imperial presidency developed, with the president assuming more powers than the constitution strictly allowed derived from a 1973 study of the presidents’ powers by the historian, Arthur Schlesinger. The manifestation in the 1960s and 1970s was directly linked to foreign policy. There had been a trend in the 1950s for foreign policy actions to be taken without formal congressional consultation and approval. The reasons can be traced back to the precedents set by the New Deal, which saw the economic problems as so severe that a great expansion of federal power was needed, followed by the unprecedented emergency powers exercised in World War II, the pressures of the nuclear age, and the threats of the Cold War, all of which led Congress to accept that presidents needed to pursue independent and unilateral action. The Cuban Missile Crisis underlined this. Johnson acted without Congressional approval by sending troops into the Dominican Republic and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave him authority to escalate the conflict in Vietnam, until revoked in 1971. Nixon did not have congressional approval for the war in Cambodia, and the bombing of Laos was not revealed to Congress. Actions in Thailand and Ethiopia were not shared with Congress. Thus, the president came to wield ‘imperial powers’ because of the nature of world events and the demands of foreign policy. This had a knock-on effect on domestic policy being conducted without the control and scrutiny of Congress, the Supreme Court, or the press, which undermined controls of the executive. Nixon pursued economic policies on his own initiative and by-passed Congressional measures by denying funds. Nixon used security forces to investigate potential opposition, culminating in Watergate, and it has been argued that the presidency shifted towards a powerful figure employing staff personally loyal outside of the regular administration. With the development of covert operations and a cult of secrecy justified by a fear that the US was under attack and could not afford transparency or congressional control or full media scrutiny, the Cold War may bear some responsibility. However, some may feel that the development of executive power in two world wars and the pressure from the extreme economic conditions of the slump might have set a dangerous precedent. Also, the personalities of the presidents might offer explanations with the development of a ‘court’ under Kennedy and with Johnson’s autocratic manner and Nixon’s dislike of scrutiny and criticism. The development of an inflated White House staff, which the founders of the constitution did not anticipate, and the increased threat of aggressive and well-informed media, may be seen as encouraging an inward-looking presidential style in which unilateral decision-making was the norm.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
7	<p>Assess the reasons for Clinton’s election victory in 1992.</p> <p>The debate might be about whether Clinton won the election more than Bush losing it. Bush’s campaign lacked vigour and purpose, and he had alienated Republicans by failing to deliver on the tax cuts promised in 1988. The performance of the economy, which was in recession, did not help Bush. Bush found it hard to deal with criticisms of the Reagan-Bush era as socially divisive and the inconsistencies of Reaganomics as the budget deficit was running at \$300 billion, despite the talk of sound finance. Also, while the Reagan era had seemed to deliver on jobs despite what appeared to be attacks on the welfare state, the situation had changed by 1992, with unemployment and economic sectors not helped by Republican policies facing hard times, as well as much talk of divisions and inequalities within US society. The conservative vote was split, with the emergence of Ross Perot’s ‘United we stand America’ campaign, which promised a balanced budget and patriotism to become a powerful third-party movement, which hit Bush much harder than Clinton. Clinton was an articulate and agile candidate, who offered a very clear focus on the economy – famously saying ‘It’s the economy – stupid’ and did well not only in traditional Democrat areas but was able to appeal to many middle-class Americans. His own rather doubtful personal history was effectively played down and his family support was strong, despite some infidelities. His owning up to smoking cannabis – modified by the statement that he had not inhaled – seemed to some to be a sign of openness and his youthful manner and enthusiasm was an asset. It was clear from the combined 62% popular vote for Clinton and Perot that there was the desire for change and a break with the Republican ascendancy.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p>Evaluate the reasons for the US involvement in Korea 1950–1953.</p> <p>Factors could include long-term strategic interests and concerns about loss of China; danger to Japan; short term crisis and fear of weakening the US position <i>vis a vis</i> Stalin in Europe. After the defeat of Japan, Korea was split between Kim il Sung's Communist North, supported by the USSR and a pro-western South under Syngman Rhee. The focus of US policy was on Europe and the policy of Containment announced in the Truman Doctrine of 1947 had Europe in mind. The situation was changed by the victory of the CCP in 1949, when the attention of the US was on the Berlin crisis. The US was unprepared for the invasion of South Korea when North Korean forces with the blessing of Stalin crossed the 38th parallel. The immediate issue was the defence of South Korea and getting US forces from Japan to hold the limited amount of territory that the sudden invasion had left in South Korean hands.</p> <p>It was important for the US to respond for a number of reasons. A victory by communist forces could threaten the entire US strategic position in the region and its position in Japan. This would be a victory for Stalin and might indicate that the position in Europe could be changed by armed action. Truman's administration was under political pressure because of the victory of the CCP in China. Even if the US were not heavily committed to the region, which it regarded as having limited intrinsic economic value, it would be politically impossible to accept another defeat and the loss of south Korea. The decision to fight was in accordance with the US containment policy under Truman and with the National Security Council report NSC-68. There was a widespread belief that the conflict in Korea, which was essentially a civil war, was symbolic of the struggle between the Free World and Communism, and that it was part of a wider conflict involving the USSR's attempts to force the allies out of Berlin and the Communists' progress in China. If Korea fell, the French could be under greater pressure in Indochina and the position of the US as a superpower would be undermined. The US might have seen a parallel with the Japanese aggression of 1941–1942 and have been encouraged by the ownership of atomic weapons and its relationship with Britain to think that a victory was possible. The chance of making the intervention a United Nations military operation was an added motivation to sustain the effort to push the North Koreans back. Because of the success in doing so and forcing enemy forces back to the 38th Parallel, as well as the desire to demonstrate US power and its role in containing and then rolling back Communism, the decision was made not just to return to the status quo, but to maintain military pressure on North Korea and push into the country. The two decisions to defend the South and then to maintain the war might be considered separately. The second was bolstered by domestic support and by the clear military superiority of US forces within and dominating the UN coalition. It resulted in a dangerous escalation as Chinese 'volunteer' forces poured in to defend the North Korean regime. The US was willing to risk this threat, which can be explained by the confidence in its military strength of MacArthur and the availability of atomic weapons even if their use would have been highly problematic and dangerous.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>Assess how far the nuclear arms race was responsible for the Cold War tension between the Soviet Union and the US.</p> <p>Cold War tensions arose from the conflicting ideologies of capitalism and communism, as well as superpower ambitions to expand their sphere of influence. President Truman was determined to contain communism and maintain the US' superiority over the Soviet Union. The nuclear arms race may have, at times, exacerbated tension between the superpowers, but much of the tension was caused by their desire to protect and expand their sphere of influence. The Cold War remained a propaganda war punctuated by proxy wars in which the US and the Soviet Union supported opposing sides, such as in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Middle East, like Africa and Latin America, became an area for Cold War rivalry. In Europe, the 1958 Berlin crisis resulted in the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.</p> <p>The nuclear arms race occurred because neither side wanted the other to gain the upper hand. The Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon in 1949 which spurred Truman to authorise the development of hydrogen bombs. However, the Soviet Union had its own hydrogen bomb by 1953. Eisenhower's 'New Look' foreign policy included using nuclear weapons, massive retaliation, and the use of brinkmanship. Khrushchev established the Warsaw Pact in 1955, and its members devised plans to wage nuclear war against NATO. In 1957, the Soviets launched their first intercontinental ballistic missile, which created US fears of a missile gap between the Soviet Union and the US. With the launch of Sputnik 1, the first satellite, the Soviet Union also began the space race with the US. There was a great fear in the US that the balance was in favour of the Soviet Union, even though the opposite was true. In 1958, the US launched its own satellite, Explorer 1 and developed its own ICBMs. This competition inevitably increased tension. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis further fuelled the tensions between the two superpowers with fear that the world was on the brink of a nuclear war.</p> <p>The nuclear arms race helped to bring the two sides together. Khrushchev had spoken of peaceful co-existence, and both Eisenhower and Dulles realised that a dialogue needed to be established with the Soviet Union. In 1959, Khrushchev visited the US briefly to meet Eisenhower at Camp David. Reports praised 'the spirit of Camp David' showing that both superpowers were willing to talk. In 1963, the <i>Limited Test-Ban Treaty</i> was signed in Moscow by the US, the Soviet Union, and the UK. This Treaty banned all tests of nuclear weapons except those conducted underground. The <i>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</i> was signed on 1st July 1968. In 1972 and 1979, the SALT I and SALT II agreements were signed by the two powers which aimed to restrict the nuclear arms race. However, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty from the Senate. When President Reagan assumed office, he referred to the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire' and he felt that he should negotiate from a position of strength. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Gorbachev was willing to negotiate a reduction in nuclear weapons, and in December 1987, he and Reagan signed the <i>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty</i> calling for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. In July 1991, the US and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Act by which time the Cold War was over.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
10	<p>‘Stalin was responsible for the outbreak of the Korean War.’ Evaluate this view.</p> <p>At the end of World War II, Korea was freed from Japanese occupation. In 1945, the Potsdam Conference decided on the division of Korea along the 38th parallel, with Soviet troops occupying the North and American troops in the South. Once the troops had departed, Syngman Rhee, supported by the US, became the president of South Korea in 1948, while Kim Il Sung became leader of the communist North Korea. Kim was keen to unite Korea under communist rule and he sought Stalin’s support which was initially denied.</p> <p>Stalin was concerned about the military weakness of the North and the possibility of American intervention. The North Koreans continued to pressurise Stalin, and by January 1950, Stalin had changed his mind. A war in Asia would draw attention away from Eastern Europe, especially after the failure of the Berlin Blockade in 1948. Syngman Rhee also lacked domestic support in South Korea and Kim was convinced that he could win. Stalin also wanted to preserve Soviet strategic interests in the Far East and to prevent US influence in the region. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, signed in February 1950, meant that the balance of power in Asia had changed from the US to the Soviet Union. However, Stalin also feared that China could challenge the Soviet Union’s dominant position in the international Communist movement. Stalin wanted to unify the Korean peninsula and to keep China under Soviet influence; the Korean operation seemed a perfect means of achieving both ends. He believed that the outbreak of the Korean War would prevent China from attacking Taiwan and would place China’s military at the service of Soviet strategy. Stalin had to ensure that China would actively support North Korea before he approved Kim’s invasion plans. The war was triggered when Syngman Rhee boasted that he was going to attack North Korea in 1950. This provided the excuse for the North Koreans to invade South Korea. The Soviets themselves only provided medical and military supplies.</p> <p>In January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in his Defence Perimeter Speech defined the American ‘defensive perimeter’ in the Pacific as a line running through Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. This excluded US military protection to the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan. Acheson was criticised for giving Pyongyang the impression that it could pursue forcible reunification if the US had ruled out military intervention to defend South Korea. The North invaded South Korea on 25th June 1950. The Security Council of the UN met the same day and agreed to take action against North Korea. In protest of the UN’s refusal to allow Communist China into the UN, Stalin and the Soviet Union were absent from the UN Security. If it had not been for this, the Soviet Union could have prevented UN backing for the Korean War. One argument put forward is that the Soviet Union wanted the US to enter the war to divert their attention away from Europe. Truman had been under fierce criticism at home, with critics claiming that he was responsible for losing China to the communists, and that he needed to take a tougher stance. Truman, therefore seized the opportunity to defend South Korea from the communists. The US took the lead in the UN action, but Truman was careful to blame communism rather than the Soviet Union although neither of the superpowers wanted a full-scale war.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
11	<p>'The Gold Coast achieved independence because of Nkrumah's leadership'. Discuss this view.</p> <p>Nkrumah played a vital role in bringing about independence for Ghana, but other factors in the post-war world made imperial powers take decolonisation more seriously. The formation of the United Nations spread ideas of national sovereignty and self-determination. African nationalists and the global mood supporting political freedom and self-government also played their part. The experiences of African servicemen in the war emphasised to them how the Europeans had been hypocritical claiming to be a superior civilisation and this helped to arouse mass feeling against, racism, oppression and colonial rule. About 65 000 soldiers from the Gold Coast had fought alongside the British in the Second World War and had returned home to poverty and unemployment; this spurred them on to support the independence movement. In 1947, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was established.</p> <p>In 1947, Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast from London to become the secretary of the UGCC. It was a movement that mainly drew its support from the middle-class and tended to pursue conservative policies. However, within two years, Nkrumah had established the more radical Convention People's Party (CPP), which adopted the slogan 'Self-Government Now', and had widespread support from different sectors of society wanting to end British rule including army veterans and small traders. In 1950, Nkrumah called on the people of the Gold Coast to support self-determination and published the party pamphlet 'What I mean by Positive Action'. Positive action involved using non-violent civil disobedience and rolling industrial strike action to challenge the British Empire. Nkrumah was imprisoned for sedition and was given a three-year sentence. However, in 1951, the CPP continued to contest the elections and won a landslide victory. Subsequently, Nkrumah was released early from prison, and in 1952, became the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast. In 1951, the CPP adopted a 5-year plan of rapid industrialisation, attempting to radically improve access to basic health, tackling literacy through implementing free primary education, and developing institutions of higher learning. Two thirds of its investment were to come from the export of surplus cocoa production and tax collection, with the remaining third from international finance loans and private sector business investment.</p>	30

Question	Answer	Marks
11	<p>In 1952, Nkrumah met the visiting Colonial Secretary who indicated that Britain would favour independence if the chiefs could also express their view. In 1953, a White Paper on a new constitution was published which was accepted by the assembly and British public, so was enforced in April 1954. It provided for an assembly of 104 members, all directly elected, with an all-African cabinet responsible for the internal governing of the colony. In the election on 15th June 1954, the CPP won 71 seats with the regional Northern People's Party forming the official opposition. Several opposition groups formed the National Liberation Movement which demanded a federal instead of a unitary government, and for an upper house of parliament where chiefs could act as a counter to the CPP majority in the assembly. The British did not want to leave the question of how an independent Gold Coast should be governed unanswered, and it was agreed that another election would be held in June 1956 and, if the CPP gained a reasonable majority, a date would be set for independence. On 3rd August, the assembly voted for independence, and under the name Nkrumah, had proposed Ghana Independence Day would be 6th March 1957.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
12	<p>Assess how far the Camp David Agreements of 1978 can be considered a success.</p> <p>The Camp David Agreements were the result of the diplomatic efforts of Egypt, Israel, and the US. It was intended that disputes between Israel and the Arab countries would be resolved, but the outcome on 26th March 1979 led to the Peace of Washington treaty between Israel and Egypt. Israelis managed to ensure the neutrality of the biggest Arab military power. Israel agreed to lose land in return for peace that also benefited Egypt. Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the Sinai, evacuate its civilian inhabitants, and restore it to Egypt. It was agreed to establish normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Israel would also be guaranteed freedom of passage through the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran, and a demilitarised area along the Israeli border. Israel guaranteed free passage between Egypt and Jordan and to return Egypt's oil fields in western Sinai. The US agreed to provide several billion dollars' worth of annual subsidies to the governments of both Israel and Egypt. It was the first time an Arab state had made an individual peace agreement with Egypt.</p> <p>However, Egypt's standing in the Arab world received a huge blow. In 1978, the Arab Summit held in Baghdad condemned Egypt and the Camp David Agreements, and subsequently transferred the Arab League headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. In 1979, Egypt was suspended from the Arab League. There was no longer a united Arab front against Israel, and many Arab countries blamed Egypt for not putting enough pressure on Israel to bring the Palestinian issue to a satisfactory conclusion. President Sadat was assassinated on 6th October 1981 by members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The agreement also reduced the negotiating positions of the other Arab states and Palestinians, who were excluded from the negotiations. It undermined the idea that Israel could only achieve peace with the Arabs if it addressed the Palestinian issue.</p> <p>Carter agreed with Begin's belief that the West Bank and Gaza were integral parts of Israel. He wanted the summit to succeed and made concessions. The framework was regarded as vague and Begin claimed that Israel would never surrender its claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. Many Arabs saw this framework for a comprehensive peace as a failure. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation was not involved in the negotiations and rejected the agreement, claiming that accepting the proposed five-year transitional period without a future guarantee of the occupied territories gave Israel time to establish further settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.</p> <p>'The Framework for Peace in the Middle East' proposed that Egypt, Israel and Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should negotiate on 'resolving' the Palestinian problem. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan should agree on how to set up an elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The framework failed to mention the status of Jerusalem, nor the Palestinian right of return. The UN General Assembly rejected it because of this, and because the agreement was concluded without the participation of the UN and PLO. This decision fundamentally altered the Carter administration's position that Israel should withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories subject to minor border adjustments. No mention was made of self-determination for the Palestinians.</p>	30