



Cambridge International AS & A Level


HISTORY

9489/31

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

May/June 2023

1 hour 15 minutes



You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Answer **one** question from **one** section only.
Section A: The origins of the First World War
Section B: The Holocaust
Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War
- Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is 40.
- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [].

This document has 4 pages

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Answer **one** question from **one** section only.

Section A: The origins of the First World War

- 1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Would any of the Entente Powers have acted differently had they known of the deep involvement of the Serbian army, though not the government, in the murder of Franz Ferdinand?

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Even if Germany is acquitted of pursuing a design for a general European war in 1914, it still had the power to prevent it and did not do so.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your answer. [40]

Section B: The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

The Final Solution became politically possible because Hitler's phrase concerning 'the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe' was adopted as a direct programme for action, partially by Himmler.

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Then, despite all opposing interests, the process should develop its own internal dynamic

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

By mid-March 1945, the Soviets were already taking over Romania in violation of Stalin's pledges at Yalta. Most decisions of all was unmistakable evidence that the Soviets also in defiance of the Yalta pact, were setting up in Poland a ready-made Communist government. Unless there was a freely established Polish regime, the heart would be cut out of the Yalta agreement, which would then turn out to be a cruel hoax.

Why did the Kremlin so rudely slap aside the hand of cooperation and fellowship? The Soviets had never allied themselves with the Western democracies in spirit, and when the fighting stopped there was a natural tendency for the Russian mind to turn to the old way of anti-Western distrust. US Secretary of State Hull observed that Moscow was started out on its independent course as early as 1944 when it sought final victory and felt less dependent on the Western democracies for aid. About the same time, Soviet policy began to stress once more the orthodox Communist ideals of internationalism and world revolution, quite in contrast to their emphasis on nationalism during the wartime crisis. This worrying development was entirely natural. Communism, which openly proclaims warfare on capitalism, could not trust the democratic world, and Moscow's policy was undoubtedly shaped by anti-capitalistic fears. These fears were deepened by the Western Allies' attitude towards Moscow's dealings with its weaker neighbours notably Poland, whose democratic status had apparently been guaranteed at Yalta. The protests of the Allies against Soviet encroachments merely confirmed the Kremlin's suspicions and provided the Russians with justification for building up anti-capitalist puppet governments.

The war-hating Americans were especially disturbed by the inability of the Soviet Union to agree with the Western world on the terms of peace for the defeated Axis enemies. Despite prolonged arguments at a series of meetings of the foreign ministers of the major powers by late 1946 no agreement had been reached on treaties with Germany, Austria or Japan. Prospects seemed dark in Germany, which had been broken up into four administrative zones. Contrary to the Potsdam agreement, the Soviets seized reparations out of current production, supported the temporary western boundary of Poland as permanent, and blocked Allied efforts to treat Germany as a single economic unit. They sought to communise Germany by propaganda, by distributing food to their supporters and by other political methods. The Russians also retained hundreds of thousands of German prisoners-of-war, contrary to agreement, and deported or lured away German scientists thus securing the expertise to make the latest type of submarines and other lethal weapons. The Russians further opposed urgently needed currency reform, persecuted anti-Communists and accused the Western powers of trying to revive Nazi business. The deadlock finally became paralysing that the three Western Allies were faced with the choice either of abandoning their respective zones leaving Germany with its enormous war potential to fall into the hands of the Russians or to create a reduced new Germany around the three Western zones. Following Secretary of State Byrnes' unpromising speech in Stuttgart in September 1946, giving notice that the United States was in Europe to stay, determined steps began in the direction of establishing a western Germany, to the accompaniment of charges from Moscow that the Allies had broken the Potsdam pact. The ghost of Hitler must have laughed out loud to see the democratic West building up Germany against Communist Russia. The disturbing conviction gradually deepened amongst the peoples of the West that the Kremlin did not want agreement – except on its own terms.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]